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36
the mob, from the midst of our puppet creatures, our slaves.
This was the foundation of the
mine which we have laid under the goy people, I should rather say, under the goy peoples.
In the near future we shall establish the responsibility of presidents.
By that time we shall be in a position to disregard forms in carrying through matters for
which our personal puppet will be responsible.
What do we care if the ranks of those
striving for power should be thinned, if there should arise a deadlock from the impossibility
of finding presidents, a deadlock which will finally disorganize the country?
In order that our scheme may produce this result we shall arrange elections in favor of such
presidents as have in their past some dark, undiscovered stain, some “Panama” or other –
then they will be trustworthy agents for the accomplishment of our plans out of fear of
revelations and from the natural desire of everyone who has attained power, namely, the
retention of privileges, advantages and honor connected with the office of president. The
chamber of deputies will provide cover for, will protect, will elect the president, but we shall
take from it the right to propose new, or make changes in existing laws, for this right will be
given by us to the responsible president, a puppet in our hands. Naturally, the authority of
the president will then become a target for every possible form of attack, but we shall
provide him with a means of self-defense in the right of an appeal to the people, for the
decision of the people over the heads of their representatives, that is to say, an appeal to
the same blind slave of ours – the majority of the mob. Independently of this we shall invest
the president with the right of declaring a state of war. We shall justify this last right on the
ground that the president as chief of the whole army of the country must have it at his
disposal, in case of need for the defense of the new republican constitution, the right to
defend which will belong to him as the responsible representative of this constitution.
It is easy to understand that in these conditions the key of the shrine will lie in our hands,
and no one outside ourselves will any longer direct the force of legislation.
Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the
Chamber the right of interpolation on government measures, on the pretext of preserving
political secrecy, and, further, we shall by the new constitution reduce the number of
representatives to a minimum, thereby proportionately reducing political passions and the
passion for politics.
If, however, they should, which is hardly to be expected, burst into
flame, even in this minimum, we shall nullify them by a stirring appeal and reference to the
majority of the whole people… Upon the president will depend the appointment of
presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber and the Senate.
Instead of constant
sessions of Parliaments we shall reduce their sittings to a few months. Moreover, the
president, as chief of the executive power, will have the right to summon and dissolve
Parliament, and, in the latter case, to prolong the time for the appointment of a new
parliamentary assembly. But in order that the consequences of all these acts which in
substance are illegal, should not, prematurely for our plans, fall upon the responsibility
established by us of the president, we shall instigate ministers and other officials of the
higher administration about the president to evade his dispositions by taking measures of
their own, for doing which they will be made the scapegoats in his place…This part we
especially recommend to be given to be played by the Senate, the Council of State, or the
council of Ministers, but not to an individual official.
The president will, at our discretion, interpret the sense of such of the existing laws as admit
of various interpretation; he will further annul them when we indicate to him the necessity to
do so; besides this, he will have the right to propose temporary laws, and even new
departures in the government constitutional working, the pretext both for the one and other
being the requirements for the supreme welfare of the State.
By such measures we shall obtain the power of destroying little by little, step by step, all that
at the outset when we enter on our rights, we are compelled to introduce into the
constitutions of States to prepare for the transition to an imperceptible abolition of every kind
