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56
Our accounts, which we shall present when the time comes, in the light of centuries of
experience gained by experiments made by us on the goy States, will be distinguished by
clearness and definiteness and will show at a glance to all men the advantage of our
innovations. They will put an end to those abuses to which we owe our mastery over the
goyim, but which cannot be allowed in our kingdom.
We shall so hedge about our system of accounting that neither the ruler nor the most
insignificant public servant will be in a position to divert even the smallest sum from its
destination without detection or to direct it in another direction except that which will be once
fixed in a definite plan of action.
And without a definite plan it is impossible to rule. Marching along an undetermined road
and with undetermined resources bring to ruin by the way heroes and demi-gods.
The goy rulers, whom we once upon a time advised should be distracted from State
occupations by representative receptions, observances of etiquette, entertainments, were
only screens for our rule.
The accounts of favorite courtiers who replace them in the sphere
of affairs where drawn up for them by our agents, and every time gave satisfaction short-
sighted minds by promises that in the future economies and improvements were foreseen.
Economies from what?
From new taxes? – were questions that might have been but were
not asked by those who read our accounts and projects.
You know to what they have been brought by this carelessness, to what a pitch of financial
disorder they have arrived, notwithstanding the astonishing industry of their peoples.
PROTOCOL NO. 21
To what I reported to you at the last meeting I shall now add a detailed explanation of
internal loans.
Of foreign loans I shall say nothing more, because they had fed us with the
national moneys of the goyim, but for out State there will be no foreigners, that is, nothing
external.
We have taken advantage of the venality of administrators and the slackness of rulers to get
our moneys twice, thrice and more times over, by lending to the goy governments moneys
which were not at all needed by the States. Could anyone do the like in regard to us?
Therefore, I shall only deal with the details of internal loans.
States announce that such a loan is to be concluded and open for their own bills of
exchange, that is, for their interest-bearing paper.
That they may be within the reach of all
the price is determined at from a hundred to a thousand; and a discount is made for the
earliest subscribers. Next day by artificial means the price of them goes up, the alleged
reason being that everyone is rushing to buy them.
In a few days the treasury safes are as
they say overflowing and there’s more money than they can do with (why then take it?).
The
subscription, it is alleged, covers many times over the issue total of the loan; in this lies the
whole state effect – look you, they say, what confidence is shown in the government’s bills
of exchange.
But when the comedy is played out there emerges the fact that a debit and an exceedingly
burdensome debit has been created. For the payment of interest it becomes necessary to
have recourse to new loans, which do not swallow up but only add to the capital debt. And
when this credit is exhausted it becomes necessary by new taxes to cover, not the loan, but
only the interest on it.
These taxes are a debit employed to cover a debit.
Later comes the time for conversions, but they diminish the payment of interest without
covering the debt, and besides they cannot be made without the consent of the lenders; on
announcing a conversion a proposal is made to return the money to those who are not
willing to convert their paper.
If everybody expressed his unwillingness and demanded his
money back, the government would be hooked on their own flies and would be found
insolvent and unable to pay the proposed sums. By good luck the subjects of the goy
